given element of Afghan society, but they largely did not foresee its rise as a driving political factor. This article thus questions whether we can argue that the CIA and US officials intentionally sponsored and created a global 'jihad' when they did not recognize changing
Islamic identities and practices in Afghanistan during the course of the invasion.
US understandings of local dynamics, and reactions to local Islamic practices and usage in Afghanistan, largely have fallen beyond the purview of scholars studying the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This conflict has spawned wide-ranging literature composed by policy analysts, political scientists, anthropologists, and increasingly, historians. Afghanistan from Monarchy to Islamic State ', Central Asian Survey, 19, 3-4 (2000) , 416-25; ibid., 'The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Nation in Exile', Current Sociology, 36, 71 (1988) , 71-92; Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present 4 US involvement in the region -which is widely recognized -largely has been commented on in passing, restricted by a limited range of available primary sources. Coll has provided one of the most extensive studies of US/CIA involvement in Afghanistan; others have reflected on the dearth of US oversight over the money and funds channelling into Afghanistan, which were far more regulated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 6 Some academics have focused on the 'Islamic' element of the insurgency -and the trajectory that led some of the same mujahidin supported by the CIA during the Soviet invasion, in turn, to morph into the terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks. 7 Academics have done less, however, to consider how contemporaneous US actors comprehended Islam in the Afghan context. Yet this is critical to understanding the broader interplay of foreign intervention and Afghan social dynamics during the conflict.
This article looks at papers generated predominantly in the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, whose analysts were (and are) responsible for producing reports and studies intended to underpin higher-level decision-making. 8 These perspectives are less familiar in the literature, but these everyday analyses importantly drove how high-level officials in the Carter and Reagan Administrations understood regional dynamics. 9 This article thus considers how knowledge was generated within the agency regarding Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, and highlights the key concerns discussed by officials.
Rather than retreading the story of CIA decision-making towards Afghanistan -or assuming that analysts presupposed an overarching 'Islamic' understanding of the region -it reflects on officials' continued attachment to orientalist tropes concerning local social and political dynamics that frequently sidelined Islam as a political force. As such, it highlights US discourses' heritage in colonial-era understandings of culture and political mobilization in South and Central Asia.
CIA analysts, contrary to much of the evidence on the ground, held a rigid view of the Afghan resistance that was tied to their understanding of Afghanistan as a 'traditional'
society. Tradition referred to a certain reading of Afghan history that placed emphasis on the 'tribal' nature of Afghan society, the country's longstanding organization into political and social units defined by familial and ethnic ties and governed by local codes and laws. Afghan tribality, in turn, was perceived as a static, backwards structure that prevented the country's development into a functioning, modern nation-state. Afghan society's primitive nature, in 6 this reading, was reinforced by its limited understanding of Islam, which was frequently described as a nebulous social force without political implications. This article is only an introductory foray into US involvement in Afghanistan.
Drawing on recently declassified CIA files, it addresses the quotidian but critical policy recommendations and analyses that undergirded the CIA's more well-known personalities.
While it recognizes that CIA analysts alone certainly did not shape US foreign policy (and that Pakistan's ISI played a critical role in determining how US aid was used), their reporting nevertheless reveals some of the key tenets of US approaches to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as US responses to the growing Islamist movements in the region.
Certainly, US, particularly CIA, observers did not perceive Islam as a major, active unifying factor for the mujahidin. In contemplating the future outlook of Afghanistan, CIA officers and analysts reflected time and again on the fragmented nature of the insurgency without suggesting any means of unification or predicting the outcome of the insurgence beyond an ultimate victory over the Soviets. This article highlights the limits of these intellectual tropes, positing as well that perhaps the CIA's restricted understanding of Afghan society left the agency bereft of the analytical tools to envision a post-invasion Afghanistan. Marxists: insurgency attacks began to seep from the Afghan countryside into the cities.
Rebellions had sprung up in Afghanistan's eastern, predominantly Pashtun, provinces almost as soon as Taraki came to power, and they spread from there.
Opposition to the Marxist regime, and the growing Soviet presence, took various forms. The mujahidin and Afghan refugees were divided by tribe and ethnicity (Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek), social background (urban, rural, 'tribal', 'settled'), and religion (Shi'ite, Sunni). Millions of Afghans simply left the country, crossing Afghanistan's porous international borders to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, they united with politicized Afghans from political parties that had functioned in exile from Peshawar for years. In some cases, they formed their own political organizations. As the number of refugees grew, so did the sway of seven main parties based in Peshawar, which will be discussed in more detail below. These parties increasingly received international support.
Worldwide condemnation of the Soviet intervention and widespread sympathy for the Afghan refugees increasingly manifested as financial aid, through the auspices of nongovernmental organizations and, more covertly, from regimes interested in destabilizing the Soviet presence, including the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Covert funding moved through (and frequently remained with) Pakistan's intelligence services, which used the main Afghan political parties to dole out aid (to both refugees and mujahidin) and govern and organize the refugee camps. A sizable portion of the mujahidin sprung from among the refugees, particularly those based in Pakistan. Commentary regarding Islam's importance to the Afghan resistance shifted somewhat with the emergence of two dominant factions among the exiled political parties based in Peshawar. As the war progressed, these political parties increasingly featured in intelligence reporting. Particularly as funds were channelled via Pakistan's intelligence services to the main Afghan political parties in Peshawar, the transborder mujahidin grew increasingly reliant on these parties for financial and military support. In Peshawar, seven main political parties had emerged since 1978. These could be roughly divided between the fundamentalists (also referred to, at times, as 'Islamists') and moderates (sometimes called 'traditionalists'). were willing to supply the mujahidin with money and guns even though their lack of coordination and internal disputes obviously limited the resistance's efficacy and had no obvious endpoint.
Whether the general lack of any sort of planning or recommendations for postinvasion Afghanistan is a result of archival limitations, or whether it perhaps had broader implications concerning US foreign policy in Afghanistan and abroad remains in question.
Given the broader regional context -the tensions that emerged between Pakistan and the United States due to the Pressler Amendment (intended to limit Pakistan's nuclear capabilities), the unexpected death of Zia ul-Haq in 1988, an unfriendly Iran, an unstable Central Asia following the break-up of the Soviet Union -either a total withdrawal or shoring up the United States' position in Afghanistan could have been promoted. Either the region was so insecure that non-involvement was best, or it required even further oversight. Given the available information, it would seem the CIA promoted the former rather than the latter.
Yet ironically, as Ahmed Rashid has pointed out, American interests in Central Asia rekindled by the mid-1990s due to the region's oil and gas reserves.
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Perhaps another facet to US ambivalence lies in the limited terms that CIA analysts used to describe and understand Afghan society both before and during the Soviet invasion. 
